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402A

OF

THE RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS-PLAINTIFF'S BURDEN OF PROOF

-The California Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff, seeking to
impose strict tort liability on a manufacturer or seller of an injurycausing defective product, does not have the burden of proving that the
defect made the product unreasonably dangerous, as required by Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 433 (1972).
Plaintiff, William Cronin, a route salesman for a California bakery, was
seriously injured when a truck forced his delivery van off the highway
and into a ditch. On impact an aluminum safety locking device, designed to hold bread trays in place, fractured, causing the loaded trays
to come forward and into the driver's compartment-propelling Cronin
through the windshield and onto the ground. He instituted suit on the
theory of strict liability in tort against the defendant J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
the sales-agent and general contractor of. the assembled delivery van.'
Expert testimony at trial established that the locking device was made
of a very porous piece of aluminum. It lacked the normal tensile
strength required to withstand a collision impact. The plaintiff alleged
that the defect made the product unsafe for its intended use and was
thereby a direct and substantially contributing cause of his injuries.
The jury agreed and awarded $45,000.
The defendant's contention at trial and on appeal was that the definition of strict tort liability offered to the jury by the trial was deficient.
It was not adequate, the defendant claimed, to require plaintiff to prove
that his injuries were proximately caused during the intended use of a
product that contained a defect when it left the manufacturer's hands
of which plaintiff was not aware. According to Olson, absolute liability
would be imposed on manufacturers of injury-causing products unless
the plaintiff had the burden of proving the product was also unreasonably dangerous,an essential element of Section 402A of the Restatement
2
(Second) of Torts.
1. Suit was originally brought against Olson, General Motors Corporation and Chase
Chevrolet, from whom the van was purchased. General Motors was voluntarily dismissed.
The jury decided in favor of Chase Chevrolet and Cronin did not appeal that ruling.
Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 125 n.1, 501 P.2d 1153, 1156 n.1, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 436 n.1 (1972).
2. Id. at 129, 501 P.2d at 1158, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 438. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS,
§ 402 A (1965):
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The California Supreme Court disagreed.3 Viewing its holding as a
step forward in the evolution of products liability law, the court adopted
the rule of strict liability in tort as it applies to products cases set forth
4
in its landmark decision, Greenman v. Yuba Power Products:
[a] manufacturer is strictly liable in tort when an article he places
on the market, knowing that it is to be used without inspection
for defects, proves to have a defect that causes injury to a human
being. 5
In the determination of the Cronin court the "unreasonably dangerous"
element "rings of negligence" 6 since it is normally phrased in terms of
ordinary consumer expectation.7 The element imposes the more difficult
negligence burden of proof from which strict liability in tort, as applied
to products cases, .was to have declared its independence. The court
therefore discarded it.
The Restatement test seeks to prevent the manufacturer from becoming the absolute insurer of every injury resulting from its products. s
The Cronin court concluded that the Greenman rule will fulfill the
identical purpose without the obstacles of proof inherent in section
402A--obstacles of proof that may allow manufacturers to avoid their
just responsibility to consumers injured by defective products. Most
decisions and commentators have viewed the Greenman rule and section
[o]ne who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused ....
3. 8 Cal. 3d at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
4. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962). Greenman is considered a landmark decision since it was the first case to apply the theory of strict liability in tort to
manufactured products not intended for intimate bodily use. The case represents a victory
for Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court, who twenty years earlier had
urged that this theory replace negligence on the public policy grounds that the manufacturer should be discouraged from marketing defective products, and if such products are
marketed, that the cost of any injury they might cause should be spread through the
whole system by insurance coverage. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150
P.2d 436 (1944).
5. 59 Cal. 2d at 62, 377 P.2d at 900, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 700.
6. 8 Cal. 3d at 133, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442.
7. Comment i to section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts states that for it to
be unreasonably dangerous:
[t]he article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge
common to the community as to its characteristics ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment i (1965).
8. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 402A, Comment c (1965); see, e.g., Shramek v.
General Motors Corp., 69 Ill. App. 2d 72, 216 N.E.2d 244 (1966); Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 111. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290
Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426 (1971); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971);
Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 212 A.2d 769 (1965).
9. 8 Cal. 3d at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr at 442.
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402A as being the same. 10 The California court, however, accepted the
dichotomy drawn between the two rules in a recent Alaska decision."
The genesis of strict liability in tort in products liability law resulted
from the courts' recognition of the economic reality of industry and
the consequent need for consumer protection.' 2 The traditional theories
available for recovery before Greenman and section 402A were negligence and strict warranty liability. Negligence produced an inadequate
remedy for many plaintiffs because of the difficulties with proof of fault
and the defense of contributory negligence.' 3 Evidence critical to the
consumer plaintiff's case was often solely within the control and superior
knowledge of the manufacturer and consequently not discoverable.
Strict liability in terms of warranty, even with restrictions on the requirement of privity, led to undesirable complications.' 4 Problems
with disclaimer and notice often provided the manufacturer of an
unsafe product with shelter from an injured consumer's claim. Moreover, warranty is a product of contract law and is therefore especially
adapted to commercial injury, not personal injury.' 5 Strict liability in
tort, on the other hand, is "strict" in the sense that it is unnecessary
to prove the defendant was negligent. And, since the liability is in tort,
the defendant cannot avail himself of the usual contract or warranty
defenses. It is, therefore, designed to be a vehicle of social policy 16 pecuniary loss will ultimately fall on the one who caused the harm and
is in a better position to control the condition of the product. The manufacturer or seller will be deterred from marketing a malfunctioning
10.

See Putensen v. Clay Adams, Inc., 12 Cal. App. 3d 1062, 1072, 91 Cal. Rptr. 319,

325 (1970); Titus, Restatement Second of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial
Code, 22 STAN. L. REV. 713 (1970); Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products
and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REv. 363 (1965).

11. Clary v. Fifth Avenue Chrysler Center, Inc., 454 P.2d 244 (Alas. 1969). The Alaska
Supreme Court adopted the Greenman rule of strict liability in tort and held that the trial
court erred when it refused plaintiff's proposed instruction to the jury that set forth the
Greenman rule. A good cause of action was established when the plaintiff proved that defects in his automobile caused carbon monoxide poisoning.
12. This change in judicial attitude is best reflected by the landmark decisions of
Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) (requirement of privity
in breach of implied warranty cases was given a lethal blow), and MacPherson v. Buick
Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916) (recognition that a manufacturer or seller
may incur liability for injury caused by a defective product on the theory of negligence
and not just on pure contract theory).
13. Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE
L.J. 1099, 1116 (1960).
14. W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTs 656 (4th ed. 1971).
15. Seely v. White Motor Co., 63 Cal. 2d 9, 403 P.2d 145, 45 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1965).
16. Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 466 P.2d 722, 85 Cal. Rptr. 178 (1970); Hawkeye
Security Insur. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 199 N.W.2d 373 (Iowa 1972); Baker v. City of Seattle,
2 Wash. App. 1003, 471 P.2d 693 (1970).
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product and, by carrying liability insurance, will distribute any loss
caused by personal injury rather than concentrate it on the individual
consumer who is not able to bear such loss. 17 Although the doctrine of
strict tort liability was at first limited to those products for "intimate
bodily use" it is now applicable to most manufactured products in a
substantial majority of jurisdictions.'
The desire of the drafters of the strict products liability provision in
the Restatement was to synthesize a rule that would strike a balance
between the interests of the manufacturer, who was not to be subject
to absolute liability, and the interests of the consumer, who was in need
of adequate remedial protection.' 9 It is in light of these conflicting
interests that section 402A and the "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" phrase was born. The rule represents a compromise designed to protect both interests.
The origin of the phrase "unreasonably dangerous" can be traced
to early warranty law. 20 The implied warranty of fitness for all particular
purposes was legally construed to mean "fit and reasonably safe for use
by the consumer."' It has been suggested by Professor Wade, a leading
authority in this area, that a more accurate and descriptive term representing what is meant by the concept would be "not reasonably safe"
since "unreasonably dangerous" sounds more like the ultrahazardous
activity traditionally within the scope of strict tort liability. 22 And,
products liability cases, involving either theories of warranty, negligence, or strict liability, indicate that what is of central importance is
not so much that the product is defective, although an essential element,
but that the defect made the product unsafe in some way. 23 For example
in Fanning v. LeMay, 24 the plaintiff fell when the soles of a recently
purchased pair of shoes became wet and extraordinarily slippery. Suit
was brought against the manufacturer and seller on theories of negligence and strict liability. The court rejected both and stated:
[u]nlike the brakes of a motor vehicle, ordinary shoes such as the
17. See note 4 supra.
18. Annot., 1 CCH PROD. IAB. REP. 4060 (1968). The Commerce Clearing House lists
32 jurisdictions that have accepted strict tort liability in products cases.
19. Sandier, Strict Liability and the Need for Legislation, 53 VA. L. REv. 55 (1967).
20. Wade, Strict Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5, 17 (1965).
21. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41, 55 (Mo. 1963).
22. See Wade, supra note 20, at 15.
23. Hall v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., Inc., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972);
Hagenbuch v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 339 F. Supp. 676 (D.N.H. 1972); City of Chicago v.
General Motors Corp., 332 F. Supp. 285 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
24. 38 Ill. 2d 209, 230 N.E.2d 182 (1967).

729

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 11: 726, 1973

ones involved here can hardly be characterized as imminently
dangerous products or products whose defective condition would
make them unreasonably dangerous to users. 25
Even though the product was found to be defective, it was not unsafe

2
and consequently there was no liability.

Strict liability has never been intended to require a product to be
perfectly safe or incapable of doing harm, but has required only that it
be reasonably safe. 27 Professor Wade believes that the "unreasonably
dangerous" phrase is intended to be the primary basis of section 402A
liability and was added by the drafters of the Restatement to prevent a
manufacturer from being held liable for injuries caused by a product
with only a minor defect.2 8 The Arizona decision of Maas v. Dreher29

supports this contention. Plaintiff injured her hand when trying to
apply a plastic waste can lid. The lid was found to be defective but not
dangerous since the defect was open and obvious and there was no
showing by the plaintiff that the condition of the waste can lid was
dangerous beyond that contemplated by an ordinary consumer. Recovery under section 402A was denied. 30 The entire emphasis in cases
interpreting section 402A, therefore, is on safety, not defect alone, and
as a result most of the courts that follow the Restatement's strict liability
rule have treated the "unreasonably dangerous" or "not reasonably
safe" element as crucially important to plaintiff's case.3 '
In essence the Cronin court predicated liability on the defectiveness
of the product. It recognized the difficulty in the use of the term "defective condition" but found comfort in Justice Traynor's comment
that "there is now a cluster of useful precedents ....
,,32 The prevailing
definition of "defective condition" is accurately stated by the Illinois
Supreme Court in Dunham v. Vaughan 6 Bushnell Mfg. Co.:3
[t]hose products are defective which are dangerous because they
25. Id. at 211, 230 N.E.2d at 185.
26. Id.
27. See note 23 supra.
28. See Wade, supra note 20, at 14.
29. 10 Ariz. App. 520, 460 P.2d 191 (1969).
30. Id. at 523, 460 P.2d at 194.
31. A representative sample of the many cases that establish the necessity of the unreasonably dangerous condition would include: Cobbins v. General Accident Fire & Life
Assurance Corp., 3 Ill. App. 3d 379, 279 N.E.2d 443 (1972); Ulmer v. Ford Motor Co., 75
Wash. 537, 452 P.2d 729 (1969).
32. 8 Cal. 3d at 135 n.16, 501 P.2d at 1162 n.16, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442 n.16.
33. 42 111. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
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to be expected in light of
fail to perform in the manner reasonably
34
their nature and intended function.
Although the concept is broad and flexible and its outer limits depend
on demands of public policy, a product is generally considered defective
if it is not reasonably fit for the ordinary purposes intended. 35 There
is to be no difference in applicability of the strict liability rule, according to the Cronin court, whether the case involves defect in design or
defect in manufacture.3 6 But a defect in design has been phrased in
terms of making the product unreasonably dangerous to the ultimate
consumer.3 7 And, a defective condition may result if it is unreasonably
dangerous to place the product in the hands of the user without a suitable warning, and no warning is supplied.38 Therefore, it can readily be
seen that "defective condition" is analyzed by reference to ordinary
consumer expectation with primary emphasis on the safety of the product. It is an objective test based on community expectations, not a
subjective test concerning the particular consumer injured. Judicial
interpretations of- "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous"
suggest that the terms are circular or interchangeable,3 9 and at least one
decision, LaGorga v. Kroger Co.,4o has so held. LaGorga inv olved a
34. Id. at 342, 247 N.E.2d at 403.
35. Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); see Farr v.
Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 179 N.W.2d 64 (1970) (for the proposition that a
defect is any condition not contemplated by the user which makes the product unreasonably dangerous to him).
36. 8 Cal. 3d at 135, 501 P.2d at 1163, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 433.
37. Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Ore. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967); Berkebile v. Brantley
Helicopter Corp., 219 Pa. Super. 479, 281 A.2d 707 (1971). See also Dean v. General Motors
Corp., 301 F. Supp. 187 (E.D. La. 1969) (the .design of the' product must be measured by
what the community is entitled to expect of those who persuade the public to buy their
product).
38. See Alman Bros. Farms & Feed Mill, Inc. v.*Diamond Lab., Inc., 437 F.2d 1295 (5th
Cir. 1971); Canifax v. Hercules Power Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 46 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1965);
Anderson v. Kliz Chem. Co., 256 Ore. 199, 472 P.2d 806 (1970).
39. Jakubowski v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 42 N.J. 177, 199 A.2d 826 (1964).
40. 275 F. Supp. 373, 380 (W.D. Pa. 1967). The suggestion is that the term "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous," as used in section 402A of the Restatement to impose
strict liability in tort on a manufacturer, conceptually expresses but one idea-that the
product is unexpectedly unsafe when put to its intended use by an ordinary consumer. It
is recognized that courts treat the terms as technically requiring two distinct elements of
plaintiff's burden of proof. For example, Lietz v. Snyder Manufacturing Co., 475 S.W.2d
105 (Mo. 1972), dearly expressed the legal distinction between defective condition and the
dangerous propensity of a product. The similarity of the terms is apparent, however, when
a court states that a defect exists if the article is not reasonably fit for ordinary purposes
for which such article is sold and used, as in Lietz, and when a product is defined as unreasonably dangerous if it is dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by an ordinary consumer as in Lunt v. Brady Manufacturing Corp., 13 Ariz.
App. 305, 475 P.2d 964 (1970). The symantics is obfuscating the basic underlying proposition-that there is something wrong with the product that the ordinary consumer would
not expect and which makes the product unsafe or dangerous.
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minor 'plaintiff who was injured when a recently purchased jacket
became ignited by a spark from a fire. The defendant argued that since
the plaintiff failed to provide supportive evidence with regard to defectiveness, liability must be denied even though the product, due to
its flammable fabric, was dangerous. The LaGorga court disagreed and
held that with respect to defects in design, "unreasonably dangerous"
41
and "defective condition" are synonymous.
Strict liability in tort, just as the theories of negligence and warranty,
requires that the plaintiff establish the unsafe condition of the product
as the proximate cause of his injuries. 42 The concept of proximate
cause, approached as a question of foreseeability, is designed to delineate
and restrain the extent to which liability will be charged to a defendant
for harm generated. Generally, courts, as a result of extreme confusion,
48
have blended the proximate cause and causation in fact question.
Whether the unsafe product was a direct or substantial cause of plaintiff's injuries is a causation in fact question. Whether it was foreseeable
that a particular harm from a product would result to a consumer within
the protected class is a proximate cause question. Inherent in the definition and application of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard there
seems to be a reflection of the concept of proximate cause or foreseeability.44 The foreseeability implications of the phrase are apparent
41. 275 F. Supp. at 380.
42. See, e.g., Denman v. Armour Pharmaceutical Co., 322 F. Supp. 1370 (N.D. Miss.
1970); Romig v. Goodyear Tire Co., 271 Cal. App. 2d 420, 76 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1969). For
recognition of the need of proof of proximate cause in warranty cases see the UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314, Comment 13 (1962 version). In Hornung v. Richardson-Merrill, Inc., 317 F. Supp. 183 (D. Mont. 1970), it was stated that terminology is the only difference between strict tort liability and warranty, the elements being identical.
43. See Prosser, supra note 14, at 234.
44. See Cornelius v. Bay Motors, Inc., 258 Ore. 564, 484 P.2d 299 (1971). In Cornelius,
plaintiff collided with another vehicle when the brakes failed on his seven-year-old used
car only a few hours after purchase. The court held that the brakes were defective but not
unreasonably dangerous since:
[t]he jury could have properly found that the ordinary purchaser of such a seven-yearold used car would recognize, expect and accept these possibilities in purchasing such
a car and would not regard it as being "unreasonably dangerous .... "
Id. at 568, 484 P.2d at 305. In other words, it is foreseeable that an old car will have worn
parts and unreliable brakes immediately after purchase and such is in the ordinary expectation of the consumer. In this regard take note of the language of Comment i of the
Second Restatement, note 5, and also Comment j which provides that in order to keep a
product from being unreasonably dangerous, the seller must warn of danger to which a
"substantial number of the population" are susceptible "if he has knowledge, or by the
application of reasonable, developed human skill and foresight should have knowledge of
the presence of the ingredient and the danger." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A,
Comments i, j (1965).

732

Recent Decisions
when a court holds that an open and obvious condition that is known
45
to the consumer cannot be unreasonably dangerous.
Some courts have defined the "unreasonably dangerous" term from
the vantage point of the manufacturer's foreseeability:
[t]he proper test of "unreasonable danger" is whether a reasonable
manufacturer would continue to market his product in the same
of the
condition as he sold it to the plaintiff with knowledge
46
potential dangerous consequences the trial just revealed.
Moreover, it has been held that the determination of whether the product is considered "unreasonably dangerous" requires the balancing of
the likelihood and the gravity of harm against the burden of precaution
that would be effective to avoid the harm. 47 This test is based on
ordinary principles of negligence and also requires foreseeability to be
applied in terms of the producer. Other courts have approached the
"unreasonably dangerous" requirement as a matter of consumer foreseeability, with the concern focused on fitness of the product and its
unexpected -dangers to the ordinary user, and not on the -conduct of
the manufacturer. 48 A jury instruction that a product is defective and
unreasonably dangerous if it "fails to guard against dangers reasonably
to be foreseen" has been held erroneous since it focuses on the conduct
of the seller rather than on the product and expectations of the con49
sumer.
Products liability law is still evolving and struggling for preciseness
in yet uncharted areas. Cogent and lucid literature is needed to stabilize
the quagmire of decisional law. In one respect the Cronin decision may
have a unsettling effect if influential in other jurisdictions. It represents
a dramatic shift in public policy toward imposition of absolute liability
on the manufacturer. The elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous"
element removes the traditional consideration given to reasonable product safety. Theoretically, a manufacturer or seller of an injury-causing
45. See Morrow v. Trailmobile, Inc., 12 Ariz. App. 578, 473 P.2d 780 (1970). See also
Proppell v. Waters, 126 Ga. App. 385, 190 S.E.2d 815 (1972).
46. Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971); see Lewis v. American
Hoist & Derrick Co., 20 Cal. App. 3d 570, 97 Cal. Rptr. 798 (1971).
47. 42 Ill. 2d 339, 247 N.E.2d 401 (1969).
48. See note 40 supra; cf. Lunt v. Brady Mfg. Corp., 13 Ariz. App. at 307, 475 P.2d at
966. See also Wulff v. Sprouse-Reitz Co., 498 P.2d 766 (Ore. 1972) (holding that what is of
primary importance in products liability litigation based on strict tort liability is not
whether the defendant acted wrongfully but what the consumer reasonably expected from
the product).
49. 13 Ariz. App. at 308, 475 P.2d at 967.
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product containing only a minor defect that is not unsafe or dangerous
in any way, henceforth in California, will be held liable. The elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous" element also removes an important aspect of the proximate-foreseeability issue. One purpose of law
is to define the, type of conduct that society expects in certain human
activity. The Cronin rule leaves to speculation important questions
concerning the type of conduct that will be required of a manufacturer
or seller, the perfection with which products must be produced, the
foreseeability that a product with only a minor defect may cause injury,
and the preciseness of performance that can be subjectively expected by
a consumer of a product.
The net result of the Cronin decision is that the plaintiff's burden of
proof is substantially lessened. The delicate balance, between the interests of the consumer and the interests of the manufacturer, attempted by
the drafters of section 402A is discarded. Since increased liability will be
imposed, a manufacturer or seller will build the resulting costs into the
costs of doing business, ultimately reflected by inflated product prices.
The Cronin approach is, therefore, a substantial deviation in public
policy that should initiate from the legislature, not the judiciary-even
though it may have a commendable deterrent effect on manufacturers
by encouraging them not to produce injury-causing products.
On the other hand, since the definitions of "defective condition" and
"unreasonably dangerous" can be interpreted, as they were in the
LaGorga case, as being identical, the practical effect of Cronin may be
deceptively slight. The Cronin court sought to cleanse strict tort liability as defined by section 402A of its "negligence complexion."5 0 An
analysis, however, of the prevailing applications of the "defective condition," such as in the Dunham case, reveals that a product will be
considered defective if it is not in the condition reasonably expected
when used for ordinary purposes. In this respect, the Cronin court, by
eliminating "unreasonably dangerous," may not have reached the objective it desired.
Donald H. Presutti
50.
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